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The mechanisms underlying social behav-
ior are indeed complex, yet researchers
have made important contributions to our
understanding of how people make judg-
ments and behave across various social
contexts. In particular, recent years has
seen a proliferation of research spot-
lighting the guiding role of embodied
and affective information in social pro-
cessing. Grounded approaches to cogni-
tion offer an exciting opportunity for
researchers throughout the cognitive sci-
ences to work within a unified framework
to shed light on traditionally nebulous and
intractable psychological quagmires (e.g.,
symbol grounding).
In what follows I will describe how
embodied and affective information influ-
ence some hallmark social processes
(moral judgments and prosociality) and
then clarify some misunderstandings
about representation and processing in
grounded cognitive systems. I will then
argue that the term “directionality” in
grounded accounts engenders misleading
views about cognition and will con-
clude with recommendations that should
improve our understanding of social
behavior from the growing perspective
of grounded cognition.
A growing body of literature indi-
cates that embodied and affective states
influence moral judgments and proso-
ciality. In the domain of moral judg-
ment, research has shown that inducing
physical disgust (via visual, olfactory, and
gustatory senses) can harshen moral judg-
ments (Schnall et al., 2008b; Eskine et al.,
2011). The conceptual overlap between
physical and moral disgust has been fur-
ther confirmed with physiological evi-
dence (Calder et al., 2001; Moll et al.,
2005; Borg et al., 2008; Chapman et al.,
2009). In a similar vein, researchers have
also demonstrated that feeling physically
clean and pure can license people to judge
others morally harsher than those feeling
dirty (Zhong et al., 2010). However, phys-
ical cleansing can also attenuate people’s
own moral guilt. Zhong and Liljenquist
(2006) found that people felt less guilty
about their own transgressions (and were
more likely to volunteer) after they had
cleansed themselves with an antiseptic
wipe, whereas those who did not receive a
wipe showed increased volunteerism (but
see also Fayard et al., 2009).
This line of research is often described
as a moral purity metaphor, in which
physical purity is metaphorically pro-
jected onto conceptual representations of
morality. However, the direction of these
effects travels both ways. A disgusting taste
in the mouth can harshen moral judg-
ments (Eskine et al., 2011), but think-
ing about moral transgressions, virtues, or
control events can lead people to perceive
a neutral tasting beverage as disgusting,
delicious, or neutral-tasting, respectively
(Eskine et al., 2012; see also Ritter and
Preston, 2011). Similarly, cleanliness can
attenuate harsh moral judgments (Schnall
et al., 2008a), while committing moral
transgressions can enhance the desir-
ability of cleansing products (Lee and
Schwarz, 2010). The implications of direc-
tionality for grounded theories will be
discussed.
In the domain of prosociality, Schnall
et al. (2010) explored whether emotional
elevation affected volunteerism (Study 1)
and helping behavior (Study 2). Overall,
they found that those who experienced ele-
vation, but not other positive emotions
like happiness or amusement, were more
likely to volunteer for an unpaid study
and help experimenters with a boring
task compared to those in control con-
ditions. Similarly, Liljenquist et al. (2010)
tested whether clean scents affect finan-
cial decisions in an economic trust game
with the prediction that clean scents will
prime purity and thus enhance altruism.
Results confirmed that those in clean-
scented rooms gave more money to an
alleged team-mate compared with those in
baseline rooms. They replicated these find-
ings by showing that clean-scented rooms
also encouraged volunteerism and mone-
tary donations for helpful causes.
To determine whether there is any
psychological truth in common taste
metaphors like “she/he’s a sweetie,” Meier
et al. (2012a) found that preferences for
sweet foods significantly predicted proso-
cial behavior, and in another study they
revealed that participants who consumed
sweet foods (chocolate) were more likely
to help another than those who con-
sumed non-sweet foods (cracker) or noth-
ing. These findings indicated that taste is
an important embodied source domain
that is projected onto abstract domains
like prosociality, which bolsters a concep-
tual metaphor view that grounds abstract
meaning in embodied source domains.
But to what extent do views like these over-
lap in their theoretical assumptions with
other views of grounded cognition (e.g.,
simulation theories)?
Broadly, principles of grounded cog-
nition assert that sensorimotor and
perceptual experiences are instrumen-
tal in the representation and processing
of concepts. Simulation (Barsalou, 1999,
2008) and conceptual metaphor (Lakoff
and Johnson, 1980, 1999) approaches
represent the two dominant theories of
conceptual grounding. Simulation models
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posit that conceptual processing recruits
(roughly) the same perceptual states
that were originally instantiated during
one’s initial embodied experiences, and
metaphorical models contend that con-
crete, embodied experiences are projected
onto abstract target domains. Although
both views are “embodied,” it remains
unclear whether the origin and organiza-
tion of conceptual knowledge ultimately
reside in simulation-based models rooted
in perceptual simulation or conceptual
metaphors as explained by cognitive lin-
guistics. I view this point as important but
somewhat tangential with respect to the
current debates on the structure of con-
ceptual knowledge. Metaphorical theories
are traditionally argued to have a uni-
directional structure (concrete-to-abstract
effects), whereas simulation theories imply
bidirectionality (concrete-to-abstract and
abstract-to-concrete effects). These views
are compatible to the extent that they both
ground meaning in embodied/affective
states, yet the issue of directionality has
caused concern among many researchers
(Landau et al., 2010; IJzerman and Koole,
2011; Lee and Schwarz, 2012; Slepian et al.,
2012).
Lee and Schwarz (2012) maintain
that the manner in which concepts are
generally represented (representational
structure) does not necessitate how con-
cepts will be processed in real-time
cognition. They argue that conceptual
representations can have unidirectional
structure but can still reveal bidirectional
effects when processed online. While
their insights are accurate, this seems
to be a point that should not require
defending if one considers the interac-
tion between conceptual representation
and processing. Representational structure
and online processing are intricately inter-
woven, so much so, that teasing the two
apart, particularly in terms of causality
(directionality), can seem at times like
more of an exercise for the armchair
than the laboratory. While classic find-
ings from cognitive science have helped
refine our understanding of representa-
tion and processing (e.g., the rejection
of traditionally accepted semantic net-
work models à la Collins and Quillian,
1969, and Collins and Loftus, 1975,
in lieu of more complex connectionist
models à la McClelland, 2000), this
representation-processing distinction is
a core component of Barsalou’s (1999)
perceptual symbol systems (PSS).
Sensorimotor activity that naturally
accompanies various perceptual states
becomes incorporated into the representa-
tional and processing structure of concrete
(e.g., cats) and abstract (e.g., generos-
ity) category domains. These embodied
perceptual states are stored in memory
and (partially) reactivated in bottom-up
format during later conceptual process-
ing. For example, many early experi-
ences of interpersonal warmth naturally
co-occur with physical warmth, such as
cradling infants. Hence, perceptual expe-
riences involved with physical and inter-
personal warmth become part of the same
representational and processing structure,
which is one way to explain the now-
popular finding that experiencing phys-
ical warmth can promote interpersonal
warmth toward a stranger (Williams and
Bargh, 2008). Here, the representations
themselves are the patterns of neural activ-
ity that span different regions of the brain,
specifically perceptual and motor areas.
While they may have some rough-and-
ready structure, the task demands, social
context, embodiment, top-down knowl-
edge, affective states, etc. will re-construct
representational-processing paths on a
case-by-case basis. Thus, it should be no
surprise that embodied states can affect
abstract judgments and vice versa (imply-
ing bidirectional structure); they all partic-
ipate in the same conceptual domain.
Therefore, while Lee and Schwarz
(2012) are correct in arguing for bidi-
rectionality in conceptual metaphors, a
significant aspect of cognition is glossed
over. I would assert that metaphori-
cal knowledge is organized along lines
of connectivity, not directionality. Both
Lakoff and Johnson’s (1999) and Lee and
Schwarz’s (2012) explanation of metaphor
indicate that embodied and abstract
domains are linked with each other and
acquired through experiential coactiva-
tion, which is theoretically consistent with
PSS. This truth in itself obviates the need
for discussion of directionality because
the manner in which these representa-
tions are activated (concrete-to-abstract
or abstract-to-concrete) is simply a matter
of the task-demands and context for a
given embodied agent.
If this is indeed the case, then (1) why
such emphasis on directionality and (2)
what does this mean for social behav-
ior? First, conceptual metaphor theory was
born (in part) out of research in linguistics
(Lakoff and Johnson, 1980), and direc-
tionality matters in linguistic metaphors.
For example, calling a “butcher a sur-
geon” is very different than calling a “sur-
geon a butcher.” The direction of the
metaphor completely changes its mean-
ing. Thus, directionality seems to be cru-
cial to understanding/inferring meaning
in linguistic metaphors, but it can be
argued to be irrelevant to conceptual
metaphors because brains do not process
information in terms of rigid directional-
ity; their processing is often determined by
context-sensitive experiences that provide
coactivations between various processing
regions. Second, in addition to propa-
gating misleading views about conceptual
processing, another danger of overempha-
sizing directionality in grounded theories
is that it can lead researchers down gar-
den path research programs. Bidirectional
and unidirectional effects can still be
accommodated by simulation models,
and both distract researchers from test-
ing more specific models of grounded-
ness. Third, though it is well-documented
that metaphorical approaches can transfer
embodied source domains to various dis-
similar abstract/target domains (Landau
et al., 2010), which implies directional-
ity, context-sensitivity can still account for
these differences, and it cannot be ruled
out that more complex activation patterns
in association areas of the brain under-
gird these effects. Therefore, since both
PSS and conceptual metaphors appear
to equally rely on such coactivations to
create substrates for conceptual develop-
ment, the use of the term “directionality”
engenders misleading views about concep-
tual representation-processing and need-
lessly creates theoretical divisions among
similar-minded researchers.
This clarification is particularly impor-
tant for social behavior because concep-
tual knowledge has been demonstrated to
be an important but flexible foundation
that shapes people’s social processing
(see Lee and Schwarz, 2011, for evi-
dence for context specificity). Therefore,
I propose that we shift the language
from “directionality” to “connectivity” to
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highlight the relative flexibility of concep-
tual systems, and how variability (cultur-
ally, contextually, and individually) helps
determine how people think, judge, and
act toward others. This view is also con-
sistent with alternative metaphorical mod-
els that rely on “blends” to engender the
kinds of temporary, embodied, contextu-
ally sensitive, and dynamical conditions
that seems most consistent with what is
currently known about cognitive process-
ing (see Fauconnier and Turner, 1998, for
a blending theory of metaphor that is
more compatible with Lakoff and Johnson,
1999, than Lakoff and Johnson, 1980).
Thus, while directionality is an appro-
priate tool for linguistic metaphors, it
proves problematic for conceptual pro-
cessing. Since these are separate domains,
this proposed distinction will similarly
be unable to accommodate linguistic
metaphors because it is tooled for investi-
gating conceptual processing.
In short, embodied/affective states
not only help ground meaning and
guide social processing but are also intri-
cately linked to online processing and
experience, upon which representational-
processing states are founded. Along these
lines, researchers have rightly argued that
more attention should be given to cultural
differences in metaphorical and embod-
ied cognition (Meier et al., 2012b), which
is better accommodated by “connective”
rather than “directional” terminology, as
the latter implies a certain amount of
rigidity that fails to empirically occur in
the brain or in social conceptual pro-
cessing. In this way, there is considerable
overlap in simulation and metaphorical
views of grounded cognition.
Embodied effects that were once strik-
ing, intriguing, and perhaps confounding,
are now commonplace, and it is indeed
time to breathe life into these effects
with systematic theory-building that is
predicated on a deeper analysis of the
mechanisms underlying grounded theo-
ries of cognition. By nature, embodied
and affective information are flexible
sources of information, which is evi-
denced by their context dependence (Lee
and Schwarz, 2011), and researchers have
just begun tapping into their malleable
(and adaptive) properties. To better inves-
tigate the nuances of grounded theories of
social behavior, I have proposed that we
reconsider our terminology in simulation-
and metaphorical-based approaches.
Rather than focusing on aspects of direc-
tionality that are couched in linguistic
theories, highlighting the connective prop-
erties that develop through coactivation
seems like a more promising path that bet-
ter reflects how the brain actually processes
information.
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